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INTELLECTUALS AND NATIONALISM IN CYPRUS: A STUDY OF THE
ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS IN THE 1931 UPRISING
Georgios P. Loizides, M.A.
'Western Michigan University, 1999
My thesis addresses the role of Cypriot intellectuals in the
nationalist movement aiming at the political union of Cyprus with
Greece. In particular, it will examine the contribution of three
intellectual categories to the 1931 uprising, namely clerics, tea
chers, and journalists. The 1931 nationalist uprising was the first
Greek nationalist mass movement in Cyprus, and can be seen as laying
the ground for the 1955-1960 armed struggle against the British, who
were the colonial rulers of the island at the time. Furthermore, I
argue that over and above the petty interests of modernized urban
elites, it was the accommodation of prevalent cultural values and
symbols that afforded the movement's resonance among the Greek popu
lation of the island. Finally, I propose that structuralist theories
viewing the development of nationalism in Cyprus as a purely hege
monic process tend to neglect the dialogical aspects of nationalist
discourse.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
General Background
To ignore the role of values in shaping a group's behavior is
vulgar materialism; to omit analysis of the conditions under
which persons conform with or deviate from their values is
vulgar idealism. Alvin Gouldner (1979, p. 59)
My thesis will address the role of Cypriot intellectuals in
the nationalist movement aiming at the political union of Cyprus
with Greece. In particular, it will examine their contribution to
the 1931 uprising, which was the first Greek nationalist mass move
ment in Cyprus, and which can be seen as laying the ground for the
1955-1960 armed struggle for union with Greece. Although my study
aspires neither to be conclusive nor exhaustive, in the sense that
it neither examines all nationalist movements in Cyprus, nor it ex
amines all intellectual categories, it does provide a basis for a
more conclusive study on the contribution of intellectuals to na
tionalist movements in Cyprus. In my effort, I will focus on the
role of three intellectual categories:

(1) clerics; (2) teachers

(elementary and secondary education teachers, as there were basic
ally no post-secondary institutions on the island at the time in
question); and (3) journalists. The 1931 uprising aimed at uniting
Cyprus with Greece, or rather to protest the powers (the British
Empire) that prevented Cyprus from exercising the Greek Cypriots'
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perceived right to politically uniting with Greece, with which they
had historical and cultural ties. Thus, the movement was imbued with
the early European (romantic) national ideology of making the na
tional unit congruent with state structure. In the case of wider
Hellenism, this ideology was expressed by a popular irredentist
nationalist movement. If we can talk of a resentiment (or trans
formation) that breaks traditional from modern ideologies, in Cyprus
this would rest in the perception that modernity allowed for self
determination, and so a demand for the assertion of political free
dom from Colonial rule, although traditionally perceived as right
and just, now was also deemed feasible.
Historical Background
The unionist movement was not a short-term affair. Discourse
expressing the demand for the union of Cyprus with Greece can be
traced to the very beginning of the 1821 Greek revolution against
the Ottomans, who then ruled both Cyprus, and what is now Greece,
and which lead to the creation of the then Kingdom of Greece. The
Ottomans ruled Cyprus between 1570-1878, and were succeeded by the
British, in exchange for British support to the sultan in case of
attack from Russia. During the 1821 Greek revolution, many Cypriots
fought as volunteers in various parts of Greece, some under their
own makeshift flag that comprised a blue cross over a white back
ground, reading: Hellenic Flag of the Fatherland Cyprus (Koumoul
ides, 1974).1

Revolutionary literature was circulated on the is-
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land by, among others, Archimandrite Theofylact, and the then Arch
bishop Kyprianos, who was in contact with the revolutionaries, sent
a letter to the Filiki Etaireia (the Friendly Society comprised the
core of the Greek revolutionaries) promising financial aid (Koumoul
ides, 1974; Kyrris, 1985; Pavlou, Piggouras & Ftohopoulos, 1983).
These developments alarmed the Ottoman authorities in Cyprus, mainly
after some of this literature fell in their hands. The Ottoman auth
orities in Cyprus promptly reacted by ordering the hanging of the
"heads of Church, and a great number of notables and common people"
(Papadopoullos, 1965, pp. 57-58).

This persecution lasted for many

months, and aimed at cutting off any possible links with the Greek
revolution that had just begun in other parts of the Ottoman Empire,
and at warning the general population that any expression of dissent
would be crushed. At the end of the massacre, 470 notables and hun
dreds of other people were hanged (Koumoulides, 1974).2

These extreme

measures did not prevent the newly elected Archbishop of Cyprus in
1828 from sending a letter to Kapodistrias--then Governor of the
revolutionary Greece--who was negotiating the borders of the new
state with the great powers (England, France and Russia), requesting that Cyprus be included in his demands (Englezakis, 1995; Pavlou
et al., 1983). This was the first official request by the Greek Cy
priot leadership for union with Greece. Although all the above point
to an already developed identification of the Greeks of Cyprus with
the fate of Hellenism in general, the idea of uniting Cyprus with
the newly established state of Greece did not develop into a mass
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movement during Ottoman rule, partly due to the harsh and swift re
action of the Ottomans to any such prospect. The few localized re
volts that did take place during the Ottoman rule were quickly contained and never developed into mass movements.3

Interestingly

enough, clerics comprised the leadership of at least two of these
revolts, during the years immediately following the 1821 Greek War
of Independence.

One instigated by Ioannikios, a monk (thus, the

rebellion is called the Rebellion of the Monk), and the other by
Nikolaos Theseus, brother of Archimandrite Theofilos (who was him
self involved in circulating revolutionary literature on the island)
and nephew to the Archbishop (Panteli, 1984, pp. 34-35). Thus, the
Enosis movement can be said to have begun during the 19th century.
This is what Panteli (1984, p. 61) is arguing.

Yet, as a social

movement, which could achieve mass mobilization, the Enosis move
ment did not develop until the arrival of the British.

Note that

Enosis is Greek for union, which was the slogan of the struggle for
the incorporation of Cyprus in the Greek state.
Greek nationalist discourse on the island intensified immediately after the British occupation of the island (1878-1959).
Hill (1972) is clear on this: "Hardly a year has passed since the
Occupation without the 'Hellenic idea' finding expression in some
form or another. It is to be observed, of course, long before the
occupation. We have noticed its first symptoms as early as 1830"
(p. 152).

Note that Hill is here referring to an envoy of the Cy

priots who was sent in an effort to persuade the Great powers to
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allow the annexation of the island to the then newly-found Kingdom
of Greece. The British, at least initially, recognized the Hellenic
character of Cypriot culture, and did little to alter it as they did
not perceive it to be a threat to the empire. In his memoirs written
in 1937 and reprinted in the U.S. in 1973, Sir Ronald Storrs, one of
the first British Governors of Cyprus (from 30 November 1926 to 29
October 1932), described his (Storrs, 1973) arrival on the island on
November 30th, 1926 as follows:
The anchor had hardly dropped before politics began with the
Commissioner of the District informing me, not without agi
tation, that the Mayor of Famagusta's Address of Welcome
would be tied up in the white and blue ribbons of Greece.
This he said had been the practice for many years: after all
the Mayor was not bound to offer any address: it would be a
pity to begin with an incident bound to offend four-fifths
of the population. (p. 480)
Elsewhere in his memoirs, Storrs (1973) comments on Greek Cypriot
national identity:
The Greekness of the Cypriots is in my opinion indisputable.
Nationalism is more, is other, is greater than pigmentations
or cephalic indices. A man is of the race of which he pas
sionately feels himself to be. No sensible person will deny
that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek
feeling, Greek... Indeed, the race-consciousness of the Greeks
is only less persistent than that of the Jews themselves.
(p. 495)
His racist stereotypes not withstanding, Storr's statement is never
theless interesting for it provides us with the impression of a man
who, although he had every reason to downplay any disloyalty by his
Royal subjects, nevertheless acknowledges that at a time when the
vast majority of the population still lived in rural areas, the
wider culture on the island was clearly Greek. Graph 1 shows the
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vast majority of the population, around 80% at the time in question,
to be rural.
It is characteristic that upon the arrival of the British the
first appointed High Commissioner of Cyprus, Sir Garnet Wolseley,
was greeted by the Bishop of Kition-Larnaca with the slogan of
Enosis, while similar feelings were expressed in the address of
notables from Lemesos (Kyrris, 1985).

In the capital Lefkosia, the

Archbishop in his greeting expressed a more collaborationist atti
tude by merely noting the expectation of the Cypriots for freedom,
justice, and equality under the law (Kyrris, 1985). Although con
fusing the Bishop of Kiti (Larnaca) with the Archbishop, Storrs
(1973) gives us a taste of the moment:
(W]hen Sir Garnet Wolseley landed at Larnaca in 1878 he was
waited upon by a deputation headed by the Archbishop who, in
his address, used the following words: 'We accept the change
of Government, inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will
help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with
Mother Greece, with which it is nationally connected.' This
attitude a large proportion of Greek-speaking Cypriots have
never abandoned. (p. 490)
Note that the term Greek-speaking Cypriots was seen by many to be
part of an effort to undermine the Greekness of the Greek Cypriots,
and in the 1930s and 1950s it was the cause of many protests.
Three years later, in 1880, at a time when the Greek state was
preparing for yet another clash with the Ottoman empire, Greek of
ficers arrived on the island to purchase mules (Cyprus was known
since antiquity for its mules).

Hill's (1972) description of the

event shows the fervor with which the Greeks of Cyprus reacted to
national crises.
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[A]t the time of the Greek mobilization and preparations for
war against Turkey a wave of enthusiasm swept Cyprus. Greek
officers came to purchase mules; to the 143 which they bought,
Cypriotes added 107 more as a free contribution; the Arch
bishop accompanied the gift with a letter to King George (my
note: the then King of Greece) expressing Cypriote solidarity
with Mother Greece. When the Greek officers sailed on 7
November, 150 volunteers went with them. What is extraor
dinary about the whole affair is that the Government, in the
face of these demonstrations maintained at first an attitude
of complete indifference. No measures were taken to restrain
the effusions of the people in public demonstrations or ar
ticles in the Press. (p. 411)
In 1887, following an article in the newspaper "I Foni Tis
Kiprou" (The Voice of Cyprus), which called for a mass demonstration
to express the needs and aspirations of the people, a National Committee was formed to organize the first such demonstration after
Britain took on the island.

About ten thousand townspeople and

villagers joined in the rally, which was attended by the Archbishop
and Greek members of the newly found Legislative Council. The rally
was addressed by a teacher and a member of the Legislative Council,
and approved a resolution (by voice), which the Archbishop, and the
members of the Legislative Council, accompanied by the crowd delivered to the High Commission (Sofokleous, 1984).

At the same

time, similar demonstrations took place in two other cities of the
island (Larnaca and Ammohostos). These early requests for union are
evident of the optimism with which the Greeks of Cyprus viewed the
change of command on the island, from Ottoman to the British.

Soon

enough, requests turned into demands, and gradually peaked into
full-blown nationalist movements in two instances; in the shortlived October 1931 rebellion, and in the 1955-59 armed struggle.
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For centuries Cyprus was ruled by foreign conquerors, and more
specifically, by the dominant power in the east Mediterranean re
gion. When the British arrived on the island, the general expec
tation, be it naive or not, was that the self-proclaimed modern
izing empire would grant the Cypriots their freedom, if only they
made their demands clear and demonstrate their popular support.
Fifty years of disillusionment with British intentions culminated in
the rise of a more aggressive nationalist movement.

CHAPTER II
INTELLECTUALS, CULTURE, AND NATIONALISM
Intellectuals
After my introductory remarks, and before embarking on the
examination of the role of intellectuals in the 1931 nationalist
movement in Cyprus, a few theoretical points must be made concerning
definitions. Pinard and Hamilton (1989) consider as intellectuals
(or intellectuals proper), all those who are engaged in occupational
roles concerned with the creation and transmission of culture (this
definition is used by Lipset, Shumpeter, and others). Although this
definition excludes practitioners and appliers of culture (highly
educated persons or persons engaged in professional and technical
occupational roles) from the category of intellectuals, these are
included in the wider category of intelligentsia. The emphasis on
occupational roles is also shared by Barber (1998) who strives "to
get a better analytic understanding of the nature and functions of
the intellectuals" (p. 17), which he views as educated elites whose
function is "providing information and justifying and criticizing
norms and values" (p. 20). Although I do not believe in any given
"nature" of intellectuals, Barber's focus on articulation and dis
semination of public discourse is helpful in the study of the poli
tical leadership roles of intellectuals. Sadri (1992), who adopts a
Weberian standpoint, suggests a set of ideal-type concepts for use
9
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as tools by the social sciences. Through examining the various types
of intellectuals as they are defined (indirectly rather than direct
ly) by Weber and other intellectuals, Sadri unfolds a continuum of
roles and functions and types of commitment (pure-knowledge-seekers
to committed intellectuals), as well as various layers (intel
lectuals as carriers of ideas to intelligentsia as organizers of
ideas).
Definitions of intellectuals as creators of culture can be
seen as elitist, since they tend to disregard other potential sources
of culture creation. With that as context, I still believe that the
emphasis on intellectuals' occupational roles is preferable to the
alternative of seeing intellectuals as possessing some innate con
stitutive quality. Thus, I consider intellectuals to be those edu
cated strata of the population, which occupy themselves with the
articulation, justification, and/or critique of culture. This defi
nition in no way implies that other categories of people not includ
ed in the above definition do not engage in intellectual work.
Culture
Although culture is not the focus of my thesis, it is my con
tention that culture is an active factor in social change. In this
sense, some clarifications on culture as an analytic tool are in
order. In my study I will adopt Ann Swidler's (1986, 1995) view of
culture as a set--or toolkit--of "symbols, stories, rituals, and
world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve
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different kinds of problems" (Swidler, 1986, p. 273). According to
this view, the causal significance of culture lies "not in defining
ends of action, but in providing cultural components that are used
to construct strategies of action" (p. 273). In other words, culture
"shapes the capacities" (p. 277) from which strategies of action are
constructed.
Structural and modernist theories neglect both culture and
action altogether, or they brush them aside by merging culture into
structure, and defining action as mere reaction to structural
strains. Efforts to provide processural explanations within the
structural outlook (i.e., Eisenstadt's concept of elites) are to say
the least underdeveloped, and the elites themselves are seen as act
ing out of mostly instrumental self-interest.

On the other hand,

action-oriented theorists (social movement theorists) tend to view
national identity as a collective identity, as opposed to a social
identity (note that Smith calls national identity a collective iden
tity, but without the distinction in question), meaning that it
emerges with the nationalist movement that gives it birth.

The only

culture that this model acknowledges as actively constructed and
processural is the culture of the movement itself. Societal culture
is either neglected, or treated as a structural background against
which activists construct their frames and strategies of action.
Until recently, most theories dealt with nationalism on a
macro level, often viewing it as a unified, monolithic social fact.
Thus, it was equated with national identity--which itself was seen

12
as monolithic and as merely reflecting existing structures rather
than as an active part of structure. This approach views nationalism
as an "ideology" that either stems from an effort on the part of the
modern state to acquire legitimation (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983;
Hobsbawm, 1990), or from a popular (ethnic) _reaction to external
forces such as global capitalism, colonialism, or imperialism (neo
colonialism) (Smith, 1995). These macro level analyses are useful in
delineating ideal types like modernity, but they fail to examine the
process of social construction and change closely, and inevitably
either fail to recognize, or take for granted, the role of the agent
in the process of social change.
Social movement theory, on the other hand, takes a more pro
cessural view of identity. Melucci (1988), for example, views col
lective identity as a process rather than a monolithically harmon
ious set of orientations. In this case, we run the risk of conflat
ing nationalism with national identity (discourse creates identity
that in turn challenges the state), almost in the reverse manner of
Gellner (the state makes the discourse that shapes identity). Social
movement theories identify social movements as creators of collec
tive identities; in this sense, modern nationalist movements (and
nationalist discourse) are seen as the founders of national iden
tities. In other words, nationalist movements are seen as the agents
in charge of constructing national identities. Jenson (1995) for
example, notes that the politics of nationalist movements include
the construction of a collective identity. She goes on further to
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note that national identities are "no more 'embodied' than are the
collective identities of other social movements" (p. 107). Such an
approach, which is common among social movement theorists, runs the
risk of neglecting the broader culture as a factor in inspiring nat
ionalist discourse, shaping it, or impeding it, thus neglecting the
role of the wider culture in the construction of national identity.
The concept of resonance, which was developed by social movement
theorists, to their credit, must be taken into account if we are to
understand how discourse can sometimes but not always lead to mass
mobilization.

The role the broader culture plays in the resonance

or not of various (competing) discourses, although not central to
social movement theorists, is examined by Ann Swidler (1986, 1995).
In essence, Swidler warns us against viewing the wider culture as a
social background, but rather to see it as a set of skills and
orientations that informs social action.
It is my view that agents, including agents advocating social
and political change, are acting in a "cultured" manner, and within
structural constraints. Furthermore, what is usually seen as instru
mental action can be said to be informed by culture (the generally
prevailing culture, but also the subculture of the group, community,
movement, or organization).

Even groups or movements that have a

stake in overturning existing cultural norms and values are usually
very careful in their wording, so as not to alienate their potential
audience, and thus achieve maximum potential for mobilization.

In

other words, even when the acting agents themselves do not adhere to
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prevailing cultural norms and values, they must take into account
the values, beliefs, and actions of what they hope to be their au
dience, and the structural constraints and possibilities of society.
Furthermore, the use of cultural symbols usually has some
instrumental function.

Because nationalist movements are acting in

a cultured way (meaning that agents have already existing personal
and social identities) they not only act out to either challenge or
support existing structures (states), but also engage in the process
of identity construction (for example in immigrant states), recon
struction (as in the Soviet Union following the October Revolution),
modification (as in ethnic nationalism--Egypt, Greece), or just af
firmation (as in state led nationalist discourse in states where
there is already a national identity).
My purpose is not to negate the social movement theories' em
phasis on action, as it truly illuminates the process of social
change, and comprises a valid (in my evaluation) argument and stand
point, against theories that over-emphasize the role of structure.
Rather the opposite, I believe that Swidler's (1986, 1995) insight
on culture as a catalyst for action opens the way for a social move
ment approach to the study of nationalism that takes both the cul
ture of the movement as well as the wider culture into considera
tion.

I hope that my effort will contribute to such an approach to

the study of nationalism.
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Nationalism and National Identity
Nationalism is what William Conolly calls a contested concept,
in the sense that it carries different meanings, and so defining
nationalism "is in the first place a definitional task and not an
empirical challenge" (Motyl, 1992, p. 307).

In light of this warn

ing, Alexander Motyl, in an article arguing for the modernity of
nationalism, notes that whatever functional definition one may use
for nationalism, the definition must be used uniformly; "internal
consistency is the goal" (p. 308). Motyl defines nationalism as a
"political ideal that views statehood as the optimal form of poli
tical organization for each nation" (p. 310), but recognizes other
possible definitions or meanings.

These include the notion of na

tionalism as a political ideology or ideal promoting self-determina
tion (statehood or self-rule), a belief in the natural and proper
division of the world into nations, a feeling of love for one's
nation, and finally, a belief in the superiority of one's nation.
In short, "these views of nationalism boil down, respectively, to
the following beliefs: in the nation-state, in self-government, in
national identity, in national well-being, and in national superiority" (p. 311).

Motyl then concludes that

a dispassionate application of the concept of nationalism
leads up to the conclusion that nationalism, in all of the
above five designations, is not only alive and well in the
West, which claims to be everything but nationalist, but it
is also quite modern. (p. 312)
Giddens (1996) defines nationalism as "the affiliation of
individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs emphasizing communality
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among members of a political order" (p. 169).

Greenfeld (1996) is

more or less in agreement with Giddens. She defines nationalism, in
its general, neutral sense, as an umbrella term which subsumes re
lated phenomena of national identity (or nationality) and conscious
ness and collectivities based on them--nations.

Most specifically,

it refers to the set of ideas and sentiments, which form the con
ceptual framework of national identity. Calhoun's definition doesn't
even require the pre-existence of a solidified consciousness (af
filiating itself with a particular political order) but rather a
mere lingua franca suffices; "Nationalism is, among other things,
what Michel Foucault called a 'discursive formation,' a way of
speaking that shapes our consciousness" (Calhoun, 1997, p. 3).
Each of the theorists mentioned above cautions that the term
is problematic, not only because of the multitude of definitions
adopted in the literature, but also because of the vagueness of those
definitions. This vagueness is not surprising considering that na
tionalism is largely a psychosocial phenomenon, and as such, diffi
cult to measure, or even define for that matter.

For my purposes, I

will adopt the widest possible meaning for the concept of national
ism, subsuming both national identity (affiliation with symbols and
beliefs--feeling of togetherness), and nationalist discourse. There
fore, nationalism can be seen on the one hand, as the political
ideology that gives primacy to the nation as a political entity, and
to national identity over other collective identities, and on the
other hand, as the discourse which both shapes and is shaped by
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national identity.
National identity is sometimes viewed as a direct, or indirect
consequence of modernization (a construct of state processes so to
speak). My view is that national identity is indeed a social con
struct (as opposed to a primordial innate quality), relational, con
textual--ever changing even, according to the social, economic, and
political reality of each era. I believe that both internal and ex
ternal factors influence nationalism, although I feel that primacy
should be given to internal factors, aided, or inhibited by external
ones. The reason I give primacy to internal factors is that nation
alism is so closely connected to national identity, and as I believe
the concept of false consciousness is problematic, I am inclined to
view external factors as having an enabling-constraining influence
rather than a determining one. I see nationalism as both the politi
cal ideology and the discourse reflecting national identity. Such a
standpoint allows for the examination of both internal and external
factors of social change, on both the macro and micro levels, and
most importantly, without neglecting the agent from the process of
change.
As national identity (and nationalism for that matter) is a
contested concept, it is neither surprising nor unwelcome that we
often find competing nationalist discourses, even within people that
profess to be members of the same nation. This competition can be
seen as a process of negotiating change, and does not always take
the form of pro- and against modernization, nor is it always based
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on opposing reactions to external factors. This nationalist competi
tion, or negotiation, sometimes reflects what Greenfield would call
a resentiment and Wallace (1956) would call a transformation of
mazeway.4
The nationalist movement in Cyprus embraced both traditional
and •modern" symbols to secure and maintain the loyalty and achieve
the mobilization of the Cypriot Greeks. An array of Byzantine poli
tical and social symbols, together with ancient Greek ideas and sym
bols, made up a medley of insignia that promoted the Greekness of
Cyprus, and the right for self-determination.5

Nationalist rhetoric

though, never attacked modernization in favor of tradition.

Mod

ernization was sought after, while tradition was held in high es
teem. Actually, one of the most often used accusations against Bri
tain by nationalists (and internationalists/communists alike) was
the neglect of the economic progress of the island--keeping Cyprus
backward.
Nationalism then, in my evaluation, is neither inherently pro
tradition, nor inherently pro-modernization. Its form and content is
ever being shaped by economic processes, social and political deve
lopments (both internal-class structure, and external-World capi
talism), and last but not least, by the visions, expectations, as
pirations, and loyalties of the people.

In its turn, nationalism

often affects political and socio-economic events. In sum, one must
not make the mistake of either downplaying or overestimating the
role of the agent in processes of social change.
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Intellectuals and Nationalist Movements
The leadership role of intellectuals in nationalist movements
is well established. Pinard and Hamilton (1989) point to a signifi
cant involvement of intellectuals in the leadership of New Left and
communal movements, such as nationalist ones.

Giesen (1998) also

makes the connection between intellectuals and nationalist move
ments, although in my evaluation he may be going too far by arguing
that, "it is usually not the impoverished and oppressed masses on
the periphery who emerge as carriers of national identity, but rath
er the elites within peripheral sectors and classes" (p. 6).

In any

case, he is not alone; Schurnpeter (1950) seems to agree with the
Giesen's observation, and notes that the people (as in the masses),
"never develops definite opinions on its own initiative. Still less
it is able to articulate them" (p. 145).

Although this argument

seems elitist, it is a recurring theme in the literature, and in
line with current structural theory, which tends to view nationalism
as the preoccupation primarily of modern, urban elites, if not as
merely the preoccupation of the state.

The connections between

education, urbanization, and class are not to be overlooked.6
Nevertheless, whether the message of an elite becomes accepted by
larger portions of the population than by its immediate client aud
ience is an empirical question, and depends on many factors (histor
ical circumstance, culture, political/economic developments, etc.).
Furthermore, public discourse is not a one way communication, but a
dialogical negotiation process.

Melucci (1988, who views social
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movements as "multipolar action systems," warns that when using a
dualistic assumption one must resort to a deus ex machina (e.g., the
intellectuals) "in order to connect the objective preconditions and
the subjective attitudes and to transform the latter into action"
(p. 332). In the case of early 20th century Cyprus, as we will see,
the nationalist message of the intellectuals seems to have had re
sonance among both urban and rural populations, partly due to its
accommodation of local cultural values, and partly due to the power
of the church to communicate its message to the majority of the
population, both urban and rural.

CHAPTER III
INTELLECTUALS AND NATIONALISM IN CYPRUS
Introductory Remarks
There were four main categories of intellectuals in pre-World
War II Cyprus: (1) clerics, (2) teachers, (3) journalists, and (4)
lawyers. Journalists and lawyers comprised new and rising in size
and status, intellectual strata, while clerics comprised the tradi
tional Cypriot intelligentsia for centuries. If Gramsci's definition
of organic intellectuals can be expanded to include cultural char
acteristics as well as class, clerics can be said to comprise an or
ganic (to religious ideology if not culture in the wider sense)
intellectual category. Whereas clerics have been virtually the only
allowed local authority for at least the previous three centuries,
teachers, journalists, and lawyers as social "classes• did not make
their appearance until the arrival of the British in 1878.
I should note that my focus on only three intellectual cate
gories does not imply that other members of the intelligentsia did
not play a role in the Greek nationalist movements of Cyprus.

In

deed, doctors were prominent in the struggle for union, and one of
the leading articulators of the unionist camp in the 1960s was a
psychoanalyst. Furthermore, poets, writers, play-writers, and other
categories (lawyers for example) have all contributed to the devel
opment of the nationalist movements of the 1930s and 1950s.
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Yet,
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clerics and teachers comprised the largest intellectual categories
in early 20th century Cyprus, with an often stated contribution to
nationalism on the island, and hence their importance to my thesis.
Journalists in the 1930s on the other hand, comprise an emerging
intellectual category, which produced nationalistic public discourse
that reached the urban population at first, and the rural subsequently.
Loizos (1974) notes that during the first fifty years of British rule there were three main categories of Greek Cypriots who had
"an interest" in Enosis; the Church, the "literate urban elite," and
school-teachers (pp. 116-117). By urban elite I understand Loizos to
mean the rising commercial class, which was indeed urban. Loizos argues that the Church supported the movement partly because it per
ceived the British as being threatening to its religious and political authority (note that this view seems to originate in Hill,
1972); the literate urban elite supported Enosis in order to claim
membership in a larger political unit; and, school-teachers sup
ported Enosis as they were socialized in the ideas of the Greek
nation through their education and training, and because it allowed
them to be the cultural gate-keepers on the island.7

Loizos (1974)

ends by arguing that
the illiterate and debt-ridden rural population, for whom Bri
tish rule brought both efficient administration and improved
economic opportunities, were not aware to any large extent of
the agitation for Enosis which Church, elite and teachers were
supporting. Only as their children became literate and as new
roads brought the politicians to the villages, did their aware
ness quicken into interest. This interest was probably still
slender by 1931. (p. 118)
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As we will see later, the participation of many villages in the 1931
uprising casts doubt on parts of Loizos' argument, mainly if we con
sider that his argument is almost identical to that of the colonial
English historian Hill (1972), whose account is at least dubious.
Furthermore, Loizos fails to mention the links between the various
intellectual categories, or to establish the links between nationa
list discourse and Cypriot culture. Had, for example, the Church de
cided to adopt a different frame to its message (even if such an
instrumental standpoint is valid), would it have the resonance it
did among the people? For instance, would the parents of the stu
dents tolerate any message taught to their children in schools had
it not been in accord with their own values and beliefs?

Another

point I must make concerning Loizos' argument is that the involve
ment of the Church in nationalist movements prior to the arrival of
the British casts doubt on his reasoning concerning the alleged anti
British interests of the Church causing its unionist stand. In any
case, Loizos' (1974) observation that teachers and clerics comprised
the core of nationalist agitation is supported by historical ac
counts. Although my thesis does not intend to debunk the claims of
the structurlists that nationalist movements are more often than not
affairs of educated, urban elites, the case of the early 20th cen
tury Greek Cypriot nationalist movement at least casts doubt on the
teleological implications of such an outlook, and if nothing else,
it shows the chamaeleonic nature of nationalism.
In another account of the rise of nationalism in Cyprus, also
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with a structuralist approach, Cypriot sociologist Caesar Mavratsas
(1998, p. 73) notes that the role of education in the "national
incorporation" (linguistic, cultural, political) and to the poli
ticization of Greek ethnicity, was of "capital importance." Mav
ratsas considers the identification of Cypriots with the Greek state
as a process that had to be "installed and cultivated" rather than
one being developed in popular consciousness through the centuries.
Nevertheless, he does acknowledge the total success of this irre
dentist project, at least on the ideological and cultural levels, in
the process of imagining Cyprus as part of a wider Greek national
state. He furthermore notes: "the dream of the Great Idea included
not only the promise of national strengthening, but also the promise
of their deliverance from an arbitrary and autarchic regime" (p.
72).

The process described by Mavratsas is not without merit, al

though it does not consider the bases for the resonance enjoyed by
the Greek nationalist vision among the Cypriots, and which must be
sought in Cyprus' Greek Byzantine past, rather than the petty in
terests of various elites. Furthermore, his position, together with
Loizos' tend to force the phenomenon to fit the model (the struc
tural model which views state processes as being central to national
identity formation). In other words, I argue that the modern Greek
Cypriot nationalist vision was in tune with the cultural models and
values of the Greek population of Cyprus, and that is where the
roots of its resonance among the population will be found.8

Only

when we consider the cultural bases of the Greek Cypriot national-
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ist discourse can we begin to understand its success.
Overall, clerics, teachers, and journalists played a major
role in the formation and development of the Greek nationalist move
ment in Cyprus. Indeed, during the 1931 uprising, the commissioner
of Pafos sent an urgent and confidential letter to the Governor of
Cyprus, noting that those who stirred trouble were basically school
masters, clerics, and lawyers (Stylianou, 1984). Even though journ
alists are not mentioned in the letter, subsequent censorship laws
nevertheless reflect their contribution to the movement. In his memoirs, Storr (1973)

expresses the predicament of the British author

ities prior to the 1931 revolt:
The Government was thus placed in a position of absolute
dependence upon an obstructive, unreasonable, and deter
minedly hostile majority, counting upon and assisted by the
dead weight of opposition and detraction continuously (and as
a rule not illegally) applied by the schools, Press, pulpit
and platform of Enosis propaganda. (p. 531)
Education and Church in Cyprus
I shall begin my discussion with an analysis of the role of
clerics as intellectuals, and their impact on the nationalist move
ment of the 1930s and 1950s.

Although education is not a sufficient

determinant in being an intellectual, it is no less a necessary
characteristic of intellectuals. Therefore, I must make some introductory notes as to the development of education in Cyprus.
Up to the latter part of the 19th century, we cannot really
speak of public education in Cyprus. Anyone who could read and write
was considered an educated person, and enjoyed a higher status in
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the village community. Anything more than basic literacy was a rare
luxury within reach only of the elite who could afford it. The Otto
mans, who ruled Cyprus for three hundred years from the 16th to 19th
centuries, paid no attention to educating the local population.
The first institution to show any interest in education was
the church of Cyprus, which was upgraded during Ottoman rule from a
cultural and religious institution to one that also enjoyed consi
derable political power through the role of Ethnarchy, meaning reli
gious and cultural, as well as national leadership. It is important
to note here that the Greek language does not differentiate between
ethnic and national. The word used to denote both is ethnos, and
therefore, Ethnarchy in Greek literally means National Leadership.
The recognition by the Ottomans of the Cyprus Church as both a reli
gious and a national (and thus politicised) institution had a pro
found effect on the power and authority the church enjoyed. Furthermore, this new role required an administrative infrastructure. As
the only organisation in Cyprus with funds available to devote to
culture, and as the only institution which actually had some use
for intellectuals and educated bureaucrats, the church took on the
role of patron of education up until the beginning of the twentieth
century. This relationship between church and education had its
limitations though. It is characteristic that the Bishop of Kyrenia
in a conversation with British journalist Agnes Smith expressed the
fear that the spread of education would pave the way for material
istic ideas to permeate Cypriot society (Prodromou, 1984).
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During the 16th-19th century, makeshift schools staffed by
poorly educated monks or priests ran in some monasteries and else
where, under the aegis of the monasteries themselves, or that of the
bishoprics.

Education in these schools was limited to some reading

and writing from scriptures and classic Greek philosophy. There was
also a school in Lefkosia, on the grounds of, and run by, the Arch
bishopric of the Church of Cyprus. The first school was established
by Archbishop Filotheos in 1741 and was housed in the Archbishopric
in Lefkosia.

From then on and up until the 20th century the few

schools that operated in Cyprus, mainly with funds from the church
or rich benefactors aspired only to teach their few students to read
and perhaps to write.

This first, three-year school was founded in

1741, and ran up to around 1780, when it was closed, allegedly due
to a particularly harsh administration of the then Ottoman governor
of the island (Prodromou, 1984). Archbishop Kyprianos, following the
footsteps of his predecessor, founded another school in Lefkosia,
housed on land that belonged to Kykko monastery, right opposite the
Archbishopric itself in 1812. This, as the previous school, apart
from church backing, was maintained by donations from rich bene
factors. In 1893, the school was upgraded to Gymnasium (intermediate
education school--high-school), and was recognized by the Greek
ministry of education as equal standing with the high-schools then
operating in the Kingdom of Greece. This recognition also reflected
the control that the Greek ministry exercised over the educational
material taught in Cyprus.

The Pancyprian Gymnasium, as it was

28
called after its upgrade, was the first modern public education
institution, and ever since, it played an important role in the
development of ideas in Cyprus.
The close relationship between church and education throughout
the 18th and 19th centuries is reflected in the origins of the in
tellectual category of teachers on the island, which can be said to
have originated in the stratum of teachers. Throughout these two
centuries, clerics and teachers are basically the only two educated
strata among the Greek Cypriot population, with a sense of mission
to create and disseminate culture. The teachers and head-masters of
the developing Cypriot schools were educated in the few Greek in
stitutions of higher education. Many of these teachers were clerics.
Furthermore, many of the posts in the church hierarchy were manned
by individuals that served successful careers as teachers. Prodromou
(1984) offers many examples of teachers that became Bishops, or
Archbishops. The relationship between church and education in Cyprus
is also reflected in the culture of the Cypriots, according to which,
teacher and father are the two socially acceptable terms used to
address a Greek orthodox priest, and are used interchangeably (Das
kale and Patera).
The turning point for Cyprus education, as with other public
institutions, was the transfer of power from the Ottoman to the Bri
tish Empire in the late 19th century. During the three centuries of
Ottoman rule, Cyprus was depleted of both resources and people due
to ill treatment, high taxation, and an arbitrary rule that kept the
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vast majority of the Greek Cypriots in virtual serfdom.

Still, the

Ottomans, in need of an indigenous social structure, which would
mediate their authority to the people, have upgraded the church,
from the religious and cultural institution it was prior to the Ot
toman conquest, to a politico-economic institution as well. Although
the Church of Cyprus had a long tradition of political and economic
involvement throughout the Byzantine era (4th-13th centuries), three
centuries of Frankish persecution reduced it to a religious and cul
tural role.9

After the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1570-71, the

newly arrived conquerors immediately re-established the Orthodox
Church as an independent organization, and recognized it not only as
a religious institution, but as a representative of the Christians
of the island, and a mediator between the authorities and the people
(Kyrris, 1985). This included the collection of taxes by the church
on behalf of the Ottomans, which gave the church considerable power
as it not only enjoyed special privileges in its new role, but also
gained administrative authority, representing the orthodox Christian
population of Cyprus in administrative matters. Papadopoulos (1965)
for example, in a study of demographic changes in Cyprus during Ot
toman rule, shows how the Church tended to underestimate the size of
the Christian tax-paying population, in its reports to the Ottomans.
In short, Ottoman rule upgraded the church to an Ethnarchy, meaning
both religious and cultural, as well as national leadership. This
new role required an administrative infrastructure, which had to be
staffed by educated personnel. After three centuries of educational
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neglect, the Church once again required an educational infrastruc
ture to carry out its upgraded mission. It is, I believe, important
to note that the status of Ethnarchy, which combines elements of
both religious and secular leadership, gives the church the power to
define what is shameful behavior, both in the religious and secular
worlds.

This power did not rest on any overt imposition of the

church's commands but rather it rested on the cultural premise of
obedience to one's own leadership (or one's own patron).
Efforts by the new rulers of Cyprus to Anglicize education on
the island were successfully resisted by both religious and civil
institutions, and so the educational system remained, throughout
British rule, under the control of the Greek and Turkish religious
authorities. The Greek Orthodox Church (through the Communal Coun
cils) controlled Greek education, and the Muslim Church controlled
Turkish education.
Nationalism and Dissent
Although competing strategies for the achievement of union
with Greece were being negotiated among the intellectuals, Enosis
itself was not seriously contested. Even though subsequent dissent
from the cause of Enosis was evident among teachers, this did not
occur until the Cypriot state took over the educational system from
the church (or more accurately, from the Communal Councils in which
the church and local politicians dominated), after 1960.
As far as journalists are concerned, the right-left continuum
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can be seen as the primary axis around which their loyalties and
opinions revolved. As so many other aspects of modern Cypriot so
ciety (from football clubs, to coffee shops, and even car brands
and import trade shops), the popular press too was split into right
press and left press. Yet, in the 1930s, the few initial Communist
intellectuals were still a very small and marginal group. In any
case, journalist accounts of national issues were in unison, and
national issues dominated both newspapers and magazines. In the
1950s struggle, we see the first dissent among leftist publications
but only on strategy (AKEL was against the armed struggle as it
developed). Dissent on issues of vision did not really become evi
dent until after the 1960s. This phenomenon points to the culture of
obedience of the day, which labeled any expression of dissent from
approved lines as shameful behavior and, by extension, branded who
ever dared to voice dissent, at least on essential issues such as
the vision and goals of the movement, as a traitor. It was only
after this ethic was eroded through urbanization, tourism, and
bureaucratization, and through the lessons of civil conflict in the
1960s and 1970s that critical discourse could really be developed
and facilitate political dialogue. In any case, due to the long pre
existing cultural identification of the Greek Cypriots (urban and
rural) with the Hellenic nation, the ideal of Enosis was treated as
sacred by the Greek Cypriot intellectuals, in the sense that it was
considered to be over and above any acceptable disagreement.

Hill

(1972) mentions that "alternative models to the Enosis by Greek Cy-
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priots did not make their appearance until after the 1931 revolt"
(p. 554).

Note that he is referring to a model calling for the au

tonomy of the island within the framework of the British Empire,
which was the one supported by the British, and some of the colla
borationists, and the one that dominated in the end, albeit within
the framework of the British Commonwealth.
That being said, it was not the case that dissent in political
and social issues was necessarily silenced.

Although up to the 1931

revolt the Church basically dominated Greek Cypriot political lead
ership, that was not without contest. The local press, as Englezakis
(1995) informs us unanimously opposed the candidature of clerics,
maintaining that the laity did not want the prelates as members of
the Legislative Council.

However, the election of the Bishop of

Kition (Larnaca) in two divisions proved otherwise. Thus we see that
on lesser issues, those of administration, etc., dissent was evi
dent, and sometimes even bitter. Yet, this accentuates even more the
difference between lesser socio-economic, issues, and the national
issue, which was put over and above acceptable disagreement.
Clerics
Although the Church as a whole and on an official level did
not fit neatly into either the radical unionist camp, or the colla
borationist camp, it did uphold and maintain the ideal of Enosis.
Various clerics, with Bishop Mylonas first, comprised the leadership
of at least the radical (nationalist) camp of Greek Cypriot political
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leadership. Apart from proclamations, such as that which sparked
the 1931 uprising, clerics have been disseminating their message
(both religious and secular) through weekly sermons which accom
panied mass (which at this point were attended by the majority of
both the rural and urban population), and through religious youth
organizations, largely in charge of Sunday school.10

Papastavros

(translating literally as Father-Stavros), one of the clergy exiled
by the British in the 1950s for his nationalist stand, offered an
interesting anecdote in a classic BBC documentary called Cyprus:
The Grim Legacy.

In it he described how during a sermon he pro

claimed the revolution, while after noticing that British officers
were moving to arrest him, he added, the revolution against evil.
Papastavros described this incident to describe the thin line cler
ics were walking by using nationalist discourse in and out of
church. The anecdote is characteristic of the potentially instigat
ing role of the sermon and how clerics were aware of its political
power.

Hill (1972) also comments on the nationalist discourse tak

ing place in the island churches when he describes a boycott of the
celebration of the English queen's Jubilee in 1887. According to
him, during the boycott *[I]n six hundred churches the clergy spoke
for Union with Greece, and sports meetings were organized so that
the English celebrations failed for lack of attendance" (p. 498).
Hill (1972) mentions another instance, which sheds light on the
potential role of the sermon as political discourse, in which the
Bishop of Pafos (a Cyprus town) was fined a large sum for sermons
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and speeches that agitated for union with Greece. It is worth noting
that while journalists were mainly an urban genre, not one of the
nineteen Cypriot Bishops belonged to the "urban-middle class" during
the seventy-seven years of British rule (Englezakis, 1995, p. 434).
Teachers

(1)

Teachers have overtly been influenced by two main factors:

The church (which also had direct control over
them--and

thus over their voice), and (2) the educational institutions of
Greece in which they trained (and in which Greek irredentist nationalism was dominant). Teachers were disseminating their message in
the classroom, but also in informal ways, and through writing in
newspapers and magazines.

These early teachers were imbued with the

orthodox Christian ethic and cosmology. They were also influenced by
the contemporary trends that influenced the rest of the Greek in
telligentsia, which was concentrated in the few centers that trained
teachers from Cyprus. These secular trends involved mainly the Great
Idea, which was the ideological framework for Greek irredentist
nationalism--the dominant political ideology in the Greek political
scene throughout the 19th century. This irredentism basically de
manded the incorporation of all Greek-speaking, Christian orthodox
populations that remained under Ottoman rule, to the then newly
found Kingdom of Greece. Greek nationalist ideology viewed modern
Greeks as directly descending from ancient Greeks, through Byzan
tium, and incorporated symbols from all three periods to legiti-
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mate the struggle for unification of all Greek-speaking, orthodox
populations of the eastern Mediterranean, and the Balkans, around
the national center--Athens (Kyrris, 1985; Mavratsas, 1998).
Greek Cypriot schools prior to the 1931 uprising were clearly
exposing their students to Greek nationalist discourse.

Storrs'

(1973) graphic description of the Greek schools of his days is very
revealing of the nationalist discourse taking place in schools:
There was no definite anti-British curriculum in the
Schools, but they were all actively Hellenizing. All Greek
Elementary Schools used the 'Analytical Programme' as
published in Greece, and adopted by the Cyprus Board of
education. No reading books were allowed in these schools
except those that were approved by the 'Critical Committee'
in Athens. The Gymnasium of each town and the Teachers
Training College were recognized by the Greek Ministry of
Education, and worked under Regulations issued there from.
Portraits of King Constantine and Queen Sophie, of Venizelos
and other worthies, but of no English Sovereign, adorned the
walls of the classrooms, together with elaborate maps of
modern Greece; while that of Cyprus, if to be found at all,
was as a rule small, out of date, worn out, and frequently
thrust behind the blackboard. (p. 493)
Hill (1973) confirms Storrs' account of Greek Cypriot schools
of the time, and adds that,
their maps represented Cyprus as part of 'unredeemed Greece'.
Portraits of King Constantine, Queen Sophia, Venizelos and of
the heroes of the Greek war of independence decorated the
walls. It was the glories of Greek history, not the achieve
ments of the British nation, that were made familiar to the
pupils they were taught that Greece was their mother-country. .
Not until after the outbreak of 1931 was the flying of the flag without Government license prohibited. (p.
492)
Note that in a footnote referring to the above passage, Hill men
tions that maps of Greece that included Cyprus were prohibited on 23
December 1936, under the Seditious Publications Laws of 1921 and
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1932, and yet that they were still being imported into the island in
1937. Maps of Greece that included Cyprus were an important tool in
nationalist discourse, as they clearly illustrated the boundaries of
the nation. At least until the 1970s, when I went to public school
in Cyprus, every school map of Greece (circulating in Cyprus
schools) had a frame on the right bottom corner, with a map of Cy
prus in it.
Journalists
Up until the end of the last century there was no such thing
as mass media in Cyprus. Information was disseminated by word of
mouth and official information was posted in public areas.

Apart

from the prohibitions of Ottoman rule there was a general lack of
the necessary infrastructure. There were no journalists, no printing
presses, and most of all, no readership of any size, as the vast
majority of the population was illiterate. When journalism made its
first steps on the island, it was by middle and high-class urban
ites.

At least up to the time in question (and surely much later),

journalism was an almost purely urban genre (Sofokleous, 1984). I
have made a survey of early Cyprus publications from the available
sources (Kyrris, 1985; Sofokleous, 1984), and have compiled Table 1.
Although rudimentary and surely neither conclusive nor exhaustive,
the table shows clearly the urban location of journalism in 1930's
Cyprus. All of the publications mentioned in the sources were pub
lished in the rising urban centers of Lefkosia, the capital (11),

Table 1
Early Cyprus Publications:

1878-1930s

Type of
Period in
Publication Print

Publisher
and Notes

Publication Title

Frequency of
Publication

Language

Ennis
(Hermes)

Monthly

Greek

Commercial
journal

1909-1911

Lefkosia

C. Samuel (private
school owner)

Kosmos
(World)

NA

Greek

Literary
journal

1909-1911

Larnaca

Scholar, teacher
and author H.M.
Barlaam

Elikon
(Material)

Monthly

Greek

Literary
journal

1910-1911

Lemesos

0. Lasonides

Estiades
(Esiades
were
vestal
virgins)

Biweekly

Greek

Literary
journal

1913-1914

Varosha
Teacher persephone
(Famagusta) Papadopoulou (this
is the first Cypriot
and· second Greek
women's journal of
time)

Avgi
(Dawn)

NA

Greek

Literary
journal

4/19243/1925

Lemesos

Location

Marxist literary
critic, journalist
and essay writer,
E. Chourmouzios
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Table 1--Continued
Period in
Type of
Publication Print

Publisher
and Notes

Publication Title

Frequency of
Publication

Language

Zinon
(Zeno)

Biweekly

Greek

1906-1908
Literary,
scientific,
and
commercial
review

Lekosia

Schoolmaster
N. Katalanos

Stasinos Stasinos I
foni tis
Kyprous
(Stasinos
The Voice
of Cyprus)

Weekly

Greek

Newspaper

1/1/18821/1887

Larmaca

Teacher
Themistodes
Theocharides

Efimeris
(Newspaper
of the
People)

Weekly

Greek

Newspaper

1906-1913

Larnaca

NA

Ethnos
(Nation)

Weekly(?)

Greek

Newspaper

8/17/1891
2/22/1893

Larnaca

Sp. Gryspis

Greek

Newspaper

9/21/18938/31/1934

Larnaca

Kl. Mesolongites

Weekly
Neon
Ethnos
(New Nation)

Location

w
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Table 1--Continued

Language

Type of
Period in
Publication Print

Weekly
Kition
(and
subsequently)
Neon Kition
(New Kition)

Greek

Newspaper

6/4/18796/9/1884

Larnaca
and then
Lefkosia

Th. Constantinides

Alithia
(Truth)

Weekly

Greek

Newspaper

12/1/18801931

Lemesos

1880-1897, Lawyer,
A.K. Palaeologos.
1897-1931,
"Progressive
Intellectual"
M.D. Frangoudes

Simaia
tis Kyprou
(formerly
Evagoras)
(Flag of
Cyprus

Weekly

Greek

Newspaper

1905-1906

Lefkosia

Lawyer, Th. Theodotou followed by
poet G. Stavrides
(ed.) and schoolmaster N. Katalanos
(redactor in chief)

Publication Title

Frequency of
Publication

(?)

Location

Publisher
and Notes
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w

Table 1--Continued
Publication Title

Frequency of
Publication

Language

Period in
Type of
Publication Print

Location

Kipriakos
Filax
(formerly
Simaia tis
Kyprou)
(Cyprus
Gurdian)

Weekly

Greek

Newspaper

1906-1921

Lefkosia

Schoolmaster (and
("influential
nationalist
activist politician") N.
Katalanos

Eleftheria
(Freedom)

Weekly
Biweekly
Daily

Greek

Newspaper

1906-1974

Lefkosia

K.' and D., Th.
Stavrinides (1906
-1922 Weekly, 19221936 biweekly,
1936-1974 daily)

Nea Foni
tis Kyprou
(New Voice
of Cyprus)

Weekly

Greek

Newspaper

1912-NA

Lefkosia

K. Pavlides

Publisher
and Notes
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Table 1--Continued
Publication Title

Frequency of
Publication

Language

Type of
Period in
Publication Print

I Fonti
tis Kyprou
(formerly
Stasinos)
(The Voice
of Cyprus)

Weekly

Greek

Newspaper

Evagoras

Weekly

Greek

Kiprios
(Cypriot)

Weekly

Weekly
Neos
Kipriakos
Filax
(formerly
Kipriakos
filax) (New
Cyprus
Gurdian)

Location

Publisher
and Notes

2/5/18871912

Lefkosia

G. Nikolopoulos

Newspaper

3/18901905

Lefkosia

Printer,
publisher, and
author P.
Michaelides

Greek

Newspaper

3/1900NA

Lefkosia

C. Filactou

Greek

Newspaper

NA

Lefkosia

C.A. Constantinides followed
by his son-in-law
B. Markides

.i:
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Table 1--Continued
Publisher
and Notes

Publication Title

Frequency of
Publication

Language

Type of
Period in
Publication Print

Salamis

Weekly

Greek

Newspaper

1907-1911

Varosha
"Progressive
(Famagusta) undergraduate of
law" L.Z.
Zaloumides and
C. Nikolaides

Ammoxostos Weekly
(Famagusta)

Greek

Newspaper

1912-1921

Varosha
L.Z. Zaloumides
(Famagusta)

Location

Cypruskypros

Biweekly

GreekEnglish

Political
journal

8/29/18788/7/1882

Larnaca

Th. Constandinides
followed by British
partner

Efterpi

Biweekly

Greek

Satirical
journal

1/21/18816/15/1882

Larnaca

Teacher and
writer Th. Constantinides

Diavolos
(Devil)

NA

Greek

Satirical
journal

1/18884/1888

Lemesos

The national poet
of Cyprus V.
Michaelides

+:-
N

Table 1--Continued
Publication Title

Frequency of
Publication

Language

Type of
Period in
Publication Print

Location

Publisher
and Notes

Salpinks
Weekly
(the Bugle)

Greek

1/1884Satirical
6/21/1937
journal
(political)
?

Lemesos

Chief Chanter of
the Church of
Cyprus S.
Chourmouzios

Biweekly
0 Ragias
(The Raya the Slave the Servile)

Greek

1/1/1898Satirical
1906,
journal
(political) 10/6/19224/16/1923

Lefkosia

Poet G. Stavrides

Diaplasis
Weekly
(Formation)

Greek

Scientific
journal

9/l/190119/6/1902

Lemesos

N.D. Frankoudes

Cyprus
Herald

Weekly

English

Newspaper

10/14/1881- Lemesos
1/22/1887

NA

Cyprus
Times

Weekly

English

Newspaper

4/1/188012/17/1881

NA

Note:

Larnaca

The table was compiled with information from Kyrris (1985) and Sofokleous (1984).
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Larnaca (7), Lemesos (6), and Varosha (3).
It is no coincidence that the first newspaper on the island
was published on 29th August 1878, the same year the British took
control of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire (Kyrris, 1985). The Bri
tish had a more liberal attitude than their predecessors concerning
the rights of colonial subjects, and even though they did reserve
the right to close down newspapers for political reasons, they rare
ly exercised that right, at least up to the 1931 uprising (Sofok
leous, 1984). Printed on a press imported from nearby Alexandria in
Egypt, the first newspaper was called Kypros (Cyprus). It was a
weekly with a circulation of one thousand. Quickly more newspapers
followed, and by the turn of the century at least seven were in
circulation. These were local, weekly newspapers, each published,
written and printed by a team of three or four people. It is impor
tant to note that the first newspaper publishers in Cyprus were
teachers (Sofokleous, 1984). Note that the same individual was us
ually owner, publisher, director, and editor of the newspaper, and
together with one to two other people they would undertake all the
tasks of publishing, from writing, to printing (Sofokleous, 1984).
It was not until 1936 that the island saw the publication
of the first daily. It was called Eleftheria (Freedom) and it con
tinued circulating until the Turkish invasion of 1974. Politics
dominated the content of these early publications, with sports and
social issues a close second.

The national issue dominated these

early newspapers, with most of their articles and editorials focus-
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ing on administrative issues, language and education, and national
liberation (Sofokleous, 1984).
Cypriot historian C. Kyrris (1985) notes that the number of
journals and periodicals that appeared in Cyprus during the first
sixty years of British rule (1878-1937) was "considerably great,"
and that this increase "points to an intellectual explosion of a ma
ture people" (p. 323). The publications mentioned in Kyrris' ac
count, are mainly literary, religious, and current event, magazines
and newspapers. It must be noted that this "intellectual explosion"
should be seen in light of the urbanization that was starting to
take place on the island. Kyrris mentions among other characteris
tics of early Cypriot journalism the "Hellenic national and historic
consciousness and a usual agreement on basic national, political and
other matters" (p. 322).
Table 1 shows that from the thirty publications cited in the
sources (Kyrris, 1985; Sofokleous, 1984), twenty-seven were Greek,
two were English (these comprise the main source of Hill's account),
and one was bilingual (Greek-English). The two English publications
were weekly newspapers, catering mainly to the British on the is
land, but also to the still few English speaking Cypriots. The bi
lingual "Cyprus-Kypros" was a biweekly political journal. Of the
Greek publications mentioned, fifteen are weekly newspapers, while
one progressed from weekly to biweekly to daily. Four literary jour
nals (ranging from biweekly to monthly), one biweekly literary,
scientific, and commercial review, four satirical journals (weekly
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and biweekly), and one weekly scientific journal complete the list.
In Kyrris' (1985) and Sofokleous' (1984) reports there are
twenty-seven individual publishers mentioned, of which the sources
offer professional information on fifteen. Of these fifteen publish
ers, six are educators, two are lawyers, two are poets, and five
carry various other professional characterisations ranging from
"progressive intellectual" (Kyrris, 1985, p. 321), to literary
critic, printer, publisher, and author. Although an in-depth study
of these early publishers would be of great value in delineating
the cultural and institutional affiliations of early journalism in
Cyprus, it is nevertheless not the focus of my study. I offer this
information partly in support of Sofokleous' (1984) argument con
cerning the connections between teachers and early journalism in Cyprus.
Sofokleous (1984) argues that the pioneers of Cyprus journalism played a "national awakening" role by criticizing rayadism
(servility) and apathy towards the colonial authorities. According
to Sofokleous, these early journalists were the "forerunners of the
'31 revolt and the 1955 liberation struggle" (p. 247).

Hill (1972),

who describes the atmosphere of tolerance the British followed up to
the 1931 uprising, seems to agree with Sofokleous' argument:
Freedom of speech and of the Press was in fact, before the
outbreak of 1931, very extensive, although the nationalists
did not always show moderation in their criticism. About 1930
seventeen Greek newspapers were allowed to discuss local poli
tical and administrative questions. (p. 494)

CHAPTER IV
INTELLECTUALS AND THE 1931 UPRISING
The Beginning of the Revolt
As we have seen, the roots of the Enosis movement must be
sought in the culture of the Greek Cypriots more than the petty
interests of specific elites. Yet, the Enosis movement, as a social
movement, can be said to have been born during the 1931 revolt,
precisely because it was not until then that a group of people iden
tified with the strategy of aggressively pursuing the goal of union
with Greece from the British colonial power. Furthermore, it was the
first time that the unionist movement demonstrated its mass mobilization potential, in the sense that it is the first time that mass
demonstrations took place all over the island. The National Organi
zation (previously known as National Assembly), which was formed in
1922 and was supported by the church and its own subscriptions, was
dissolved one day before the uprising due to internal polarization
between extremists and collaborators (Kyrris, 1985).

This break in

the Greek Cypriot leadership signified the beginning of the revolt.
Two years before the 1931 uprising, a group of teachers,
lawyers, journalists and other intellectuals and people of other
professions established the conspiratorial National Radical Union of
Cyprus (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi Kyprou, EREK)" (Hill, 1972; Kyr
ris, 1985). This group comprised the core of the radical fraction in
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the Greek Cypriot political leadership. It is useful to note that
this group was probably mainly an urban group. If we analyze the
signatories of EREK's October 18, 1931 programmatic proclamation,
we will see that nineteen out of the twenty-one signatories are from
various towns, with only two from urban areas. Furthermore, it is
useful to note the signatories' professions as stated next to their
name; six lawyers, five merchants, four educators, three physicians,
two journalists, and one secretary. Yet, disagreement among intel
lectuals revolved around the strategy rather than the end result of
union, which was fervently supported by both camps. Bishop Mylonas'
proclamation was the manifestation of the strategy adopted by the
extremist camp of EREK. This was also the line that prevailed and
led to the 1955 uprising.

It is exactly this polarization in the

Cypriot leadership ranks that signifies the birth of the Enosis
movement. The polarization between collaborationists and extremists
among the Cypriot intellectuals partly reflects a general change in
attitude, which stemmed from disillusionment setting in after the
initial optimism that accompanied the British take-over of the is
land. This disillusionment is expressed well in Bishop Mylonas'
proclamation, which begins as follows:

"Greek brothers, fifty three

years of British occupation have convinced all and proved beyond
doubt that enslaved people do not free themselves with pleading,
requesting, and appealing to the sentiments of the tyrants" (Stylia
nou, 1984, p. 53).
Stylianou (1984) sheds some light on the role of the journal-
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ists and clerics in the 1931 uprising. As he notes, the events that
led to the uprising reached a critical level of agitation after the
resignation of the Bishop of Kiti (Larnaca) from his position as
member of the Legislative Council on October 17 (it was made public
on Sunday, October 18). In his resignation proclamation, Bishop
Nicodemos Mylonas urged the Greeks of Cyprus to pursue "national
liberation through the union with Mother Greece, at the cost of any
sacrifice, and in every means" (Stylianou, 1984, p. 53). Within 48
hours of the proclamation, the rebellion spread all over the island.
To suppress the uprising, the British brought in troops from Egypt,
which were dispersed to both the rural areas and the towns (Kyrris,
1985). The mother-daughter symbolism in Greek Cypriot nationalist
discourse is indicative of the way Cypriots saw their relationship
to Greece, and persists in political discourse to this day. It is
not a coincidence that this mother-daughter model is also used to
denote the relationship between the Cyprus Church, and the Ecumen
ical Patriarchate in Constantinople (Istambul).
Panteli (1984) argues that the movement for union in the
1930s, "was based on spiritual ideals and not on material grievances.
Hence the illiterate Cypriot peasant" cared much less for the na
tional aspirations of the educated minority--the priest, physician,
lawyer and schoolmaster. The unionists drew their support "almost
entirely from the organized urban masses and, generally speaking,
from both the right and the left" (p. 158).

Although Panteli's ar

gument seems to underestimate the power of the Church to disseminate
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its message to the rural population, his observation on the leader
ship of the movement is in agreement with other historians and
social scientists (Kyrris, 1985; Stylianou, 1984). In any case, it
is understandable that the impact each intellectual category made
and to which strata of the population depended on lines of communi
cation between the intellectuals and their audience. Teachers for
example, surely had more direct impact in urban areas, where the
concentration of schools was higher (and mainly among the upper than
the lower classes), while priests may have had more impact in rural
areas, where secularism--with its separation of church and polity-
was not yet dominant. Furthermore, the unionist movement was backed
by intellectuals expressing both traditional (Byzantine Christian
through church and teachers) and modernized (journalists and tea
chers) sections of the population. Be that as it may, as all three
categories were pursuing the ideal of Enosis with equal fervor,
unionist discourse was reaching all strata of the population.
It is interesting to note that on January 19, 1932 the Com
missioner of Lemesos, in a report to his superiors commenting on the
results of the uprising, mentions that members of the Cypriot high
class were viewing the national goals with materialistic criteria,
for they believe that under British rule, their interests were
served better than if Cyprus came under Greek control. He went on to
note that these individuals were expressing their views only in pri
vate, in fear of being branded a traitor by their Greek Cypriot
compatriots (Stylianou, 1984). Although one must be careful in as-
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sessing the objectivity of colonial reports, mainly when they deal
with anti-colonial revolutionary movements, this report on the one
hand, points to the fact that obedience to group leadership was part
of Cypriot culture, and on the other hand, lends support to the ar
gument that the nationalist movement in Cyprus was not as elitist as
the literature may suggest (at least classwise). Thus, among the
cultural bases that sustained the movement, we must include this
long Christian tradition of obedience to group leadership. This fea
ture kept going strong in Cyprus culture, at least up to the 1990s,
and still does in many facets of Cyprus society.
The Revolt in the Urban Centers
At the time of the British takeover in 1878, the urban popula
tion of Cyprus was barely 16%. By 1920, it had risen to 20%. During
the 1920s, urbanization proceeded with a slow but steady pace, only
to increase, still with a steady pace, during the 30s.

Table 2 and

Figure 1 reveal the demographic structure of Cypriot society at the
time in question.
Stylianou (1984) offers a day-to-day account of the 1931 uprising, which basically consisted of mass protests and other actions
of disobedience to British authorities, which on one occasion led to
the burning of the Governor's House. The various localized protests
would more often than not begin with the church bells calling the
local population to the protest, and the crowd marching with pa
triotic songs and slogans to the nearest official building, where
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they would attempt to raise the Greek flag in the place of the union
jack, while proclaiming union with Greece.

At the forefront of each

procession, there were usually the religious leaders, together with
municipal and political leaders, followed by as many people as the
momentum of the day could amass.
Table 2
1931 Cyprus Population by Residence
District
/Town

Area
in Sq.
Miles

Total
District
Population

Population
within
Municipal
Boundaries

Rural
Population

Rural
Population

Lefkosia

1,040

110,010

23,324

86,686

78.8

Lemesos

542

57,841

15,066

42,775

73.9

Larnaca

398

42,108

11,725

30,383

72.1

Ammohostos
(Varosha)

784

71,472

8,229

63,243

88.5

Pafos

574

43,769

4,467

39,302

89.8

Kyrenia

246

22,659

2,049

20,610

91.0

3,584

347,859

64,860

282,999

81.3

Total
Population
Note:

The table was compiled from information contained
in the 1931 Census (in Stylianous, 1984).
In the capital Lefkosia, there were two proclamations circu-

lating on October 18th:

That of Bishop Mylonas and that of EREK.

53
E-='.Et\1-='.H TOY 11,\HC:>YBIOY KATA nEPIOXH. l8ol•i97J

Population growth by area, 1881-1973

x,>.1081:.;
Thousands

:: j

10vo,.o
Total

::�

..,

:::

�

.......................

334 j

:t. . . .
7·

284

·Acrt1Ktc; 1u:p1oxtc;
Urban are
/

::]'"""
-t-··..···•
234 �
184 :::;
134

84
34

:::.:.:: : : : ::: :: :::::::.::: : : : : :==-1- .

. ;·· · · · ·· ·

i

____________.....,____....,.____..,._,.__
1881 1891

n 11 ·,11:

1901 1911 1921

1931 1946 1960 1973

·Etoc 'A1t0Yoa<0i'lc
Census year

4'1µo7pa,p11,:;, ··uou:11:; 1974 (Kv1tplUICTI !\:)µOICpotia). ,\QJl((l)(riO.. 1975, (1. 28.

Source:
Demographic Report 1974 (Republic of Cyprus), Nicosia, 1975, p.28

Figure 1.
Source:

Population Growth by Area of Residence.
Demographic Report 1974 (Republic of Cyprus),
Nicosia, 1975, p. 28.

Note: The above Figure was taken from Rangou (1983, p. 34). I have
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EREK's proclamation circulated as a leaflet, which in support of
bishop Mylonas' move, put forth a ten point program aiming at unit
ing Cyprus with Greece (Panteli, 1984; Stylianou, 1984). By late
afternoon of the same day it was made known that the Greek members
of the Legislative Council decided to resign in support. The news
sparked a chain of events; "the stores and workshops were closing
down and people headed to the Lefkosia Commercial Club--while the
Faneromeni Church bells were ringing non-stop" (Stylianou, 1984;
p. 60).

Dionysios Kykkotis, chief priest of an important Lefkosia
church (the Faneromeni), headed the demonstration that ensued.
Hill's (1972) graphic, if ironic, account is nevertheless clear and
concise: "Holding a Greek flag, he kissed it and 'declared revolu
tion•• (p. 548). The demonstration was three to six thousand strong
(British sources mention three, while Greek participants quoted by
Stylianou mention up to six thousand), and was powerful enough to
cause even moderate Greek Cypriot politicians to adopt a more radi
cal tone.

G. Hadjipavlou, for example, a member of the Legislative

Council who spoke at the rally, began his speech by criticizing Bis
hop Mylonas for his preemptive strike. After being shouted down, he
adopted a more hard-line tone (Stylianou, 1984). After the various
leaders finished with their speeches, the shouts to the Governor's
House, which were probably instigated by young EREK sympathizers,
began to thicken. Despite desperate calls by various leaders for the
crowd to disperse, accompanied by promises for more action the next
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day, people began to walk towards the Governor's House, headed by
Dionysios Kykkotis, Greek Cypriot politicians, teachers and other
radical leaders (Stylianou, 1984). When the demonstration reached
Governor's House, some of its leaders called on to the people to
disperse, but it was too late. The people began to stone the small
police force that was guarding the building, the police fired, and
the protestors set the building ablaze (Hill, 1972; Kyrris, 1985;
Panteli, 1984; Stylianou, 1984). Police fire injured fifteen pro
testors, from which one later died. This incident, and others like
it, in turn fueled more reaction by the population (more demonstra
tions following the news of the death, even more during the funeral,
etc.), and added to the unionist pantheon of heroes, thus streng
thening the Enosis movement. It is also understood that these events
were putting pressure on the more moderate politicians and other
leaders to take sides, on the union issue, and articulate a justi
fication for their choice. In this sense, competing nationalist
public discourses stemmed from the events in 1931.
In Lemesos, there was no mass reaction to Lefkosia's de
monstrations, at least until the arrival to the town of the Bishop
of Larnaca Mylonas on October 20, after an invitation by Lemesos
representative N. Kl. Lanitis. A crowd of about 3,000 gathered in
the town's football stadium to hear Bishop Mylonas speak.

After

wards, the protestors moved eon masse to another location, where
again Bishop Mylonas gave a speech, as did other notables of the
town. After the speeches the protest dispersed quietly. The next
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day, Bishop Mylonas visited the neighboring village of St. Tycho
nas, where he again gave a revolutionary speech. One day later, the
Bishop returned to Lemesos, where news was heard of a shipment about
to depart from Lemesos market with supplies to the Lefkosia gar
rison. A crowd promptly formed in the market area and destroyed the
supplies. Later on, they marched to the Bishopric where Bishop My
lonas addressed them and said that if the people of Lefkosia would
not allow the local British garrison to be supplied, then it would
be a shame for the people of Lemesos to allow the colonialists to
be supplied by Lemesos. A demonstration was formed, and headed to
the Commissioner's House. The protestors, armed with Greek flags,
wooden sticks, and nationalist songs, reached the Commissioner's
House and set it on fire. On the next day, the British authorities
of the town were reinforced and moved to arrest Bishop Mylonas.
Upon hearing the news of the arrest, a large mass of people headed
towards the Bishopric, where he was held, aiming to free their
leader. Police opened fire, resulting in one death and five injur
ies. Bishop Mylonas and other notables were swiftly exiled (Stylia
nou, 1984).
The news of the Lefkosia demonstrations reached the town of
Ammohostos (Varosha) and the surrounding villages by October 23.
After being notified by Greek Cypriot town leaders that they could
not guarantee the result of any effort to pacify the people of the
town, the local colonial authorities evacuated the British residents
to a British Navy ship that was anchored at Ammohostos' port, and
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called on the population for calm. Despite these calls from the
authorities, the next day there was an 800 strong demonstration,
which marched towards the Municipal Hall. Another, larger demonstra
tion was planned for the following day. By then the news of the un
rest had reached the surrounding villages and the rally on October
24 was 8,000 strong. The town Mayor, and various other politicians,
teachers and notables spoke at the rally. The unrest and fragmented
demonstrations that followed for about six days resulted in the
killing of a protestor from a neighboring village (Stylianou, 1984).
Again, this supports Stylianou's point that upon hearing the news of
unrest in their district's town, villagers would descend upon the
town and take part in the demonstrations.
In Larnaca, seat of Bishop Mylonas, there was a 600 persons
strong demonstration and march, which was headed by Bishop Mylonas
himself, on the very day of Mylonas' proclamation. Other demonstra
tions on October 24 and October 25 clashed with police forces with
no injuries. It is interesting to note that villagers from many
surrounding villages marched on foot in separate processions (Greek
flag at the forefront), to join in the demonstrations (Stylianou,
1984).
In the smaller towns of Kyrenia and Pafos, events took on a
similar form (for information on the size of the various districts/
towns, see Table 2). In Kyrenia, demonstrations did not break out
until Sunday October 25, at which time the Bishop of Kyrenia was
stopped at a roadblock by security forces eon-route to Lefkosia and
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was turned back. Shocked and insulted by the refusal of the British
to allow him free movement, he returned to Archangelos Church in
Kyrenia, right before the sermon was over. There, he called on the
participants to raise the Greek flag, and despite the reservations
of the mayor, headed a procession to the Commissioner's House.
There, the people replaced the union jack with a Greek flag.

The

British sent police, and under threat of force, the protestors
dispersed. The British also set up roadblocks to prevent the in
flux of villagers to Kyrenia, although they were not very successful
in their task, at least on this occasion, and the number of pro
testors gradually increased to around 1,000 people. The subsequent
demonstration ended up in a clash with police forces, and the pro
testors suffered two injuries and one death (Stylianou, 1984). The
Bishop of Kyrenia was arrested and later exiled with the Bishop of
Larnaca and other political and religious leaders.
In Pafos, as in Larnaca, and elsewhere, the local Bishop's nationalist speeches prior to the October 1931 events, created
an atmosphere of revolutionary expectation (Stylianou, 1984).

By

October 22, the news of the unrest in the capital and elsewhere had
reached the people of Pafos. At around 7 p.m., all the bells of the
town's churches began to call the people, which started to gather in
front of the Bishopric. This first demonstration was dispersed a few
hours later, after electing representatives to contact Bishop My
lonas and ask him to speak to a larger rally being organized for
the 24th. In the meantime, reinforcements to the Pafos garrison be-
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gan to arrive and were greeted by student demonstrations. On the
24th, separate demonstrations took place by various groups, which
converged near the garrison quarters, only to hear their represen
tatives inform them of Bishop Mylonas' arrest. The demonstration
dispersed grudgingly after a British military squad armed with
Lewis machine-guns and headed by Pafos Commissioner moved to dis
perse them (Stylianou, 1984).
The Revolt in Rural Areas
The difference between rural and urban subcultures was not
very pronounced due to the small distances between villages and
towns, and the relatively good communication lines between them,
which allowed many to commute, and thus keeping rural communities
alive (Loizos, 1974). Furthermore, traditional villages in Cyprus,
as in other Mediterranean societies, resemble miniature towns.
Traditionally Cypriot villages revolved around the village church,
which in this respect replaced the ancient citadel.

The central

plaza typically contained the Church (or Mosque), the village coffee
shop(s), and residential buildings crowded around it. It is char
acteristic that traditionally, both villages and towns comprised
church parishes. Large villages could comprise two or more such
parishes, each identifying with a patron saint who also bore the
name of the parish church. Towns typically contained many parishes
(who still compete during Easter celebrations for the most beauti
ful epitaph shrine). Cultivated fields encompassed the village, not
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each residence separately. In this setting, a civic ethic (civilta)
was cultivated, thus making the transition from rural to urban cul
ture smoother. It must be noted that the urbanization process which
took place during the first half of the 20th century was not sus
tained through industrialization; it was rather commerce and a grow
ing service industry (public servants, teachers, and later the tour
ist industry) that sustained it.
The participation of rural communities in the movement is
noted by Kyrris (1985) who mentions disturbances in 400 villages,
but also by Panteli (1984). Panteli notes that "though the towns,
especially Lefkosia, were the main centres of discontent, scores of
villages were also active" (p. 143).

He also mentions "excitement

and demonstrations" (p. 143) in 200 out of a total of 598 Greek
Orthodox and mixed Orthodox and Moslem villages on the island.

The

number 200 seems to have originated in Storr's (1972, p. 542) ac
count, who was Governor of Cyprus at the time of the revolt, and
who argues that 389 out of the 598 "Greek Orthodox and Mixed Ortho
dox" villages took no part in the revolt. Again one must warn
against accepting colonial reports as accurate when in search of
historical data, mainly when such reports clearly take into con
sideration their authors' own agenda to downplay any disloyalty of
British colonial subjects. In any case, a number of 200-400 out of
598 Greek and mixed villages taking some part in a semi-spontaneous
revolt is certainly no proof of the alleged absence of the villagers
in the revolt.11

On the other hand, if we take into consideration
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the information given by Stylianou (1984), we get a clearer picture
of the contribution of rural Cypriots to the revolt.
When the events that sparked the revolt in Lefkosia and
subsequently in the other towns of the island were made known to the
rural areas, there were demonstrations, gatherings, and other ac
tions by the local Greek Cypriots, aiming at protesting British
occupation (Stylianou, 1984). This shows, according to Stylianou,
that on the one hand the villagers were expecting some kind of re
volutionary move against the British colonials, and on the other
hand that the movement was island-wide and had popular support.
According to Stylianou (1984), of the nine Greek Cypriots
killed by the colonial authorities during the uprising, six were
inhabitants of villages, while only three were urban dwellers. The
summary of the ages and place of residence of the dead is found in
Table 3.

The number of rural inhabitants' deaths during the upris

ing at least points to a number of villagers at the very forefront of
the demonstrations.
Although Stylianou (1984) does not offer an exhaustive account
of all the events in the uprising, his chapter concerning the atti
tude of the Greeks in rural Cyprus surveys official colonial reports
in the archives of the Arch-secretariat of Cyprus (that were unpub
lished until 1984), and reports the major events mentioned.

The

picture that emerges from his account is one of protest against the
colonial symbols, their replacement by Greek symbols, and civil un
rest and disobedience to authority, accompanied by the cry for
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Table 3
Protestors Killed by Security Forces in the 1931 Revolt
Residence
Rural

Name

Age

Urban

Onoufrios Clerides

18

Lefkosia

Kyriakos Papadopoulos

35

Lefkosia

Savvas Masouris

N/A

Kato Zodia

Georgios Moutsios

36

Akaki

Panagiotis Demetri

25

Charalambos Fili

18

Lefkoniko

Michael Ioannou

N/A

Karavas

Loizos Loizides

24

Dikomo

("old) Saloumis

N/A

Mandria

Lemesos

Note: The table was compiled with information given by Stylianou
(1984). As I have no feasible means to triangulate the information
provided by Styllianou, and being conscious of the potential mis
understandings when translating/reporting, the reader must consider
the possibility that some of the rural residents may have been living
in an urban center, yet still consider and declare themselves to be
from their village of origin. Still, this table lends support to
Stylianou's argument that upon hearing news of disturbances, many
villagers would go to the nearest town for information and partici
pation in demonstrations.
Enosis.

The aim was seemingly not to inflict any real damage (which

was also impossible given the absence of any central authority to
facilitate grandiose plans) to the colonial structure, but to assert
the will of the people so to speak. The hope still lingered that the
British would yield to the "popular will" and hand over the island
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to the administration of the Greek state, although this expectation
was now mixed with an implied or else threat.

The Lemesos Com

missioner, in his report, underlines the fact that "inspite of this
extraordinary state of upheavel the actual damage done was not
great" (in Stylianou, 1984, p. 148).
Although the incidents of nationalist protest in October 1931
in rural Cyprus are too numerous to reference, a quick mention of
the major trends is in order. One major trend during the revolt, in
both villages and towns, was the replacement of symbols of British
occupation with national Greek symbols by locals. The raising of the
Greek flag in place of the union jack is mentioned in most instances
of protest in villages mentioned by Stylianou (1984).

In Cambos

(district of Lefkosia), for example, news of the events in the cap
ital arrived by October 22. On that day, community members gathered
at the village coffee shop, and raised the Greek flag. In another
act of defiance, they also cut off the village telephone connections
and prohibited a British administrator of the Forestry Department
from entering the village. Similarly, at Morfou, district of Ky
renia, the villagers gathered outside the local railway station and,
after raising the Greek flag, sang nationalist songs.
Another trend in rural protests was the clashing of villagers
with British military and police forces. On October 26, in Zodia, a
group of 150-300 protestors gathered with Greek flags to face a Bri
tish military contingent that was en route to Pafos. The protestors
began to stone the troops, who promptly fired, killing one man and
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injuring an 18 year old woman and a 10 year old boy. On the same
day, similar events took place in the villages of Kalopanayiotis,
Psimolofou, and Argaki, where police fire injured two residents
(Stylianou, 1984).
Yet another trend of village protests comprised efforts to
inflict damage to colonial infrastructure, such as destroying tele
phone lines, setting administrative buildings on fire, and stealing
guns from police stations. Stylianou offers many examples of this
trend, like the efforts of villagers from Morfou to inflict damages
to the Morfou railroad station, while residents of Vyzakia village
tried to set the local police station on fire. In Dora, two rifles,
a bayonet, and four shotguns were stolen from the Dora Police Sta
tion. Similar incidents are mentioned in Lissi, Paralimni, Bogazi,
and other villages.
A fourth form of village protest was interference with colo
nial administrators. In many villages, including Arsos, Vassa, Omo
dos, Zoopigi, Lofou, Agros, Kivides, Eptakomi, and Marathovounos,
there were incidents of villagers disarming local authorities, while
in other villages there were incidents of preventing colonial ad
ministrators from carrying out their tasks. The uprising in the vil
lages was suppressed by special pacification measures undertaken by
the colonial authorities, which instigated patrols in the major vil
lages (Stylianou, 1984).
Unfortunately, Stylianou (and presumably the reports them
selves) does not give us any details of the makeup of the groups of
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rural protestors, although his account seems, at least to me, con
vincing of the mass nature of village protests. In other words, the
events of village unrest, as they unfold in Stylianou's (1984) ac
count, do not seem to be the work of a small conspiratorial elite,
but seem to have had the support of whole communities. It is inter
esting to note that in the villages local political and administra
tive authority was expressed in the face of the koinotarhis (Vil
lage Council Head). So, when talking about rural Cyprus, and the
original cultural leadership duo of the priest and teacher, we must
take account of the koinotarhis. Stylianou (1984) mentions that the
majority of Greek Cypriot Village Council Heads in the district of
Lemesos had resigned following the demonstrations in the capital
and the ensuing colonial reaction, and that the rest were also
considering resignation.
The picture painted by Stylianou presented above is in stark
contrast with Hill's (1972) account, who more or less presents the
Village Heads as being in conflict with such annoyances. When de
scribing a petition by the Church of Cyprus to the British demanding
the union of the island with Greece, in July of 1930 (three months
before the uprising), Hill argues that the Mukhtars (the Turkish and
traditional Cypriot dialect word for Village Council Head) supported
the colonial status of the island, and that they only publicly sup
ported Enosis under pressure by the Church. The following quote from
his account is, I believe, interesting for it not only comments on
the quality of his account's data, it also shows how, even if we
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take all his reservations into account, there still remains a large
number of village commissions that publicly supported the national
ists. According to Hill (1972), of 496 commissions of villages which
were presented with the petition for signature,
on inquiry it was found that in 378 the whole commissions
signed; in 66 all and in 52 some (usually the mukhtar him
self) refused. Many who signed only did so under pressure; 22
such cases were reported from one District alone--102 vil
lages, for some reason, were not asked. The Greek mukhtars of
two important villages said: 'We don't approve of the Union,
we don't want Greece, and we do want England to govern us. He
who wants Greece, let him leave us alone and go there.' In
April 1931 a leading mukhtar said that 80 per cent of the
villagers desired to remain British and would vote against
Union if they were free to do so. (p. 544)
Unfortunately the villagers were not free to do so, and so we can
never know. I must note that Hill does not offer the source of this
information, and as I felt I could not possibly do justice to his
account of the above incident by merely paraphrasing it, I let the
reader assess the quality of Hill's account. Be that as it may, even
if we take Hill's account for granted, we are still left with the
great majority of Cyprus communities (both urban and rural) conform
ing in one way or another to church backed nationalist discourse,
prior to the October 1931 uprising.
The Aftermath
The aftermath of the 1931 uprising comprised, apart from the
nine dead protesters and great material destruction, 2,952 persons
tried and 2,679 persons convicted for offenses related to the revolt
(Panteli, 1984). It is important to note here that the dead added to
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the pantheon of the "martyrs of the struggle,• and the stories of
those arrested added to the pool of stories and symbols that com
prise cultural knowledge, thus giving the nationalistic movement
more impetus.
Following the uprising, the British authorities instituted a
series of repressive measures, including the dissolution of poli
tical parties, curfew, the prohibition of the raising of the Greek
flag, and censorship of Greek newspapers and magazines. Furthermore,
a number of leading clerics, union leaders, and political leaders
were exiled.

Specifically, the list of exiled leaders included,

apart from clerics, both conservative (rightist) and communist lead
ers, which shows that the ideal of union with Greece enjoyed a wide
agreement (Panteli, 1984). The educational system also became more
and more centralized. The period following the 1931 insurrection is
still remembered by Cypriots as Palmerocracy (after the name of the
then Governor) as the harshest period of political repression in
modern times. Part of the measures that affected education included
(a) the direct control of all elementary schools by the colonial
authorities; (b) limitations in the administration and functioning of
the Greek secondary schools; and (c) education of elementary school
teachers in an English speaking government controlled Teachers
Training College (Kyrris, 1985; Panteli, 1984; Spyridakis, 1974).
The new British policies on education were perceived by the
Greek population and teachers, clerics, and other intellectuals
alike, and without undue reason, as an effort to de-Hellenize the
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culture of Cyprus.12

In a letter to the editor of the New York

Times on May 5, 1952 (twenty years after the new educational policy
was implemented), Pancyprian Gymnasium Headmaster Dr. C. Spyridakis
(1974) protested the colonial educational policy, and ended thus:
I regret to say that the whole educati_onal policy of the
Cyprus Government tends to depart from the educational pro
gramme applying in Greece in an attempt to undermine the
Greek ideal in the minds of the young generation. (p. 485)
Spyridakis, who served as a schoolteacher and a schoolmaster in Cy
prus from 1923 to 1960, was headmaster of Pancyprian Gymnasium when
the rebellion broke out. In his account, Spyridakis comments on his
efforts to "rescue the flame of national education," (p. 36) without
clashing dangerously with the authorities and their newly imposed
limitations on Greek education.

It is evident that educators were

careful not to cross the structural boundaries set up by the British
colonial authorities, even while communicating nationalist ideals.
Censorship of the press was enforced by the Commissioner of
Lefkosia, H. Davis, who issued a report on his work in 1931. In his
report, Davis mentioned that even the serious press tended to glorify the protagonists of the events, with the justification that the
events, as "deplorable" as they were, publicized the problem of the
Cypriot people to the wider public in Greece and other countries. In
his report, Davis contrasts the agitating role of the Greek jour
nalists with that of their Turkish Cypriot counterparts who, accord
ing to Davis, have proved themselves to be more law-abiding (Stylia
nou, 1984). Davis' comments reflect the British policy of divide and
conquer, which, in my evaluation, was one of the main causes of the
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ethnic conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in later years.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A narrative dealing with a chamaeleonic phenomenon such as
nationalism, must be very careful not to present the phenomenon as a
monolithic, homogeneous process with clearly defined causes and ef
fects. Furthermore, one must not force the phenomenon to fit any
preferred theoretical model. Rather, a study should exhibit what
Lofland calls intimate familiarity with the data.
My thesis has attempted to show that the Enosis movement was
affirming rather than negating of the traditional culture of the
Greek Cypriots, while at the same time, transforming it into its modern
form. The movement was inspired by developments in the wider Hellenic
world (creation of the Greek state, Great idea, etc.) and
the traditional culture of the island, and its resonance in the
Greek population of Cyprus was due partly to its accommodation of
pre-existing cultural models. Greek Cypriot intellectuals articu
lated the symbolic values of the prevailing wider culture, while at
the same time contributing to the construction of the various stra
tegies of action drawn up to realize those values. As we have seen,
the demand for union of Cyprus to Greece was not a short-term poli
tical goal, but rather a century old demand for the political real
ization of its people's traditional cultural ties with mainland
Greece. This is one of the reasons why we do not have much disagree70
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ment on what were perceived as "national issues" among intellec
tuals, almost up to the creation of the Cyprus republic. The commu
nist party AKEL's disagreements with the armed struggle can be seen
as the first expressions of a rising group of critical intellectuals
as opposed to traditional intellectuals in Cyprus. Even then, the
differences were of strategy rather than of goal. The communist
party AKEL, for example, which embodied the collaborationist camp,
opposed the 1955 armed struggle (which was headed by a fervent anti
communist) but agreed with conviction on the principle of Enosis
(union), at least up to the point of the Communist defeat in the
Greek civil war of the 1950s. Another reason for the evident lack of
major internal opposition to the "national issue,• was again due to
cultural reasons, namely the prevalence of the Christian Orthodox
ethic of obedience to one's own leadership, which for Greek Cypriots
in the 1930s was embodied by the Church of Cyprus.

ENDNOTES
1Elliniki Simea Patris Kyprou.

Note that Koumoulides trans

lates it as Hellenic flag of the state of Cyprus. The flag is exhibited
in the Museum of National Struggle in Athens.
2Kyrris (1985) mentions 500 "Greek Cypriot notables, prelates
and clergymen including the three metropolitans for their alleged
involvement in revolutionary activities connected with the Greek War
of Independence" (p. 281).

Note that in the hierarchy of the Church

of Cyprus, the term Metropolitan is used in place of the term Bis
hop.

When translating in English, some writers use both terms in

terchangeably.
3Note that not all these anti-Ottoman revolts were led by
Greek Cypriots, nor were they all driven by nationalistic fervor.
4In his study of revitalization movements, Anthony F.C. Wal
lace (1956) coined the term mazeway to denote the mental image of
society and its culture as perceived by individuals.

A revitaliza

tion movement is one involving a reshaping of the mazeway. This con
cept is similar to the concept of resentiment used by Greenfeld and
social movement theorists.
51 see the refusal of the right to self-determination, or
euphemistically, decolonization, as being central to the process of
rising nationalism.
6For a discussion on the positive relationship between class
and education, and urbanization and education in early 20th century
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Cyprus, see Markides et al. (1978).
7Note that Loizos (1974) attributes his argument concerning
the reasons of the Church involvement in the nationalist movement to
a personal communication with K. Markides.

Yet, this argument seems

to originate in Hill (1972), who argues that the movement for union
was the affair of small elites rather than a popular demand (much in
agreement with Loizos and Mavratsas).

Hill state that "there is no

room for doubt that among the elements hostile to the preservation
of law and order a prominent place was taken by the Orthodox clergy,
who found their influence and the prestige which the archbishops as
ethnarchs had enjoyed under the Turks, waning.

Whether they

express the real sentiments of the population, whose grievances are
connected rather with taxation than with national politics, is
another question.

But political agitation is the breath of life to

people who have been imbued with Greek culture" (p. 495).
8How modern Greek nationalist discourse and Greek national
consciousness is, is contested, not only by nationalists themselves,
but also by more objective scholars.

Armstrong (1982) traces the

roots of the modern Greek national identity to the thirteenth cen
tury.

Late Byzantium is characterized by the shrinking of the em

pire of the areas that had a Greek speaking, orthodox population.
During this period the empire lost its ecumenical character, while
at the same time the Greek ethnic origins, which up to this point
were dismissed as pagan, began to be acknowledged as legitimate and
part of the glorious past of Hellenism.

So for more than two cen-
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turies, the Greeks (and among them, the Cypriots) were developing,
or recreating a national past.
9The Franks followed a policy of forced religious assimilation
in Cyprus which, among other things, ultimately demanded the ac
knowledgement of the Pope as the highest authority.

This policy

ranged from reducing the number of orthodox bishoprics from 14 to 4
and displacing them to remote villages, to the burning of orthodox
monks as heretics (Kyrris, 1985).
10The Organization of Christian Youth Groups (OXEN), operating
under the aegis of the Cypriot Church, was and still is a catalyst
for the socialization of youth into the Greco-christian nationalist
ideals.
11"Now there are 598 Greek Orthodox and Mixed Orthodox vil
lages in Cyprus, of which 389 took no part whatever in the distur
bance; nor was any evidence ever discovered that the outbreak was
premeditated or prearranged" (Storrs, 1973, p. 542).
12The conscious efforts of the British to counteract the
unionist movement by undermining Greek culture become evident through
an examination of British documents dating from the 1931 uprising up
to 1959.

Argyrou (1995), who undertook such an examination, pre

sents strong evidence of this argument.
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